"Titadyn", el libro de Iglesias, y la campaña de "El Mundo"

[Isocrates]

Unos comentarios sobre la contaminación y las precauciones necesarias para evitar contaminar trazas de explosivos. Se trata de los protocolos seguidos en los laboratorios del REino UNido, como fueron expuestos por la Testigo Linda Jones en el Juicio de Oklahoma -¿No he recomendado ya alguna vez la lectura de las actas de ese juicio?-

Q. As a matter of fact, at your lab in the trace explosives
facilities, you can't just come walking in. The door is
locked; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And anybody that comes in, they have to follow a strict
procedure before they come into the trace facility; right?
A. Yes.
Q. They have to wash their hands?
A. Yes.
Q. They have to be swabbed to ensure that they're not
contaminated -- their hands, I mean.
A. Not visitors. Anybody that's actually working on case work
swabs their hands.
Q. Visitors wash their hands?
A. Yes.
Q. Put gloves on?
A. Yes.
Q. They wear those Tyvex suits -- is what they call them here.
I don't know what they --
A. Tyvex suit is better than a bunny suit.
Q. Okay, bunny suit.
Now, what about their feet?
A. They would wear, again, Tyvex overboots.
Q. Okay. Do you have one of those things like a sticky mat
that they step on before they come into the trace facility?
A. Yes, that's right, like a flypaper.
Q. And everybody has to walk across that?
A. Yes.

Es decir, que para entrar en la parte del laboratorio de la unidad de explosivos que busca trazas de explosivo es necesario, lavarse las manos, restregarlas bien, ponerse guantes, unos vestidos especiales, unas cubiertas para el calzado y pasar por encima del "flypaper". Toso para evitar contaminaciones.

Pero no es solo eso.

Q. Okay. How about quality control at your lab? Do you all
have a system whereby you make a general sweep, if you will, of
the explosives trace facility to determine for general
contamination from time to time?
A. Yes, we do.
Q. How often do you all do that?
A. Some areas are done on a weekly basis, and other areas less
frequently.
Q. And that's done so that you know -- you know what the
general contamination level is in the lab at any given time;
right?
A. The general background levels, yes.
Q. Because every lab is going to have a problem with that;
right?
A. It depends -- it depends on the lab and the type of work
they do.
Q. I didn't mean to call it a problem. Every lab is going to
have some general level of background contamination if they
work in trace analysis?
A. It depends on what trace they're looking for. But yes --
yes, I mean -- I wouldn't imagine all labs would have an
explosive --
Q. Correct.
A. -- trace backgrounds. It's just that's our area of work,
so that's what we've got to monitor for.
Q. Sure. Now, the reason that you do the quality control or
the general sweeps is so that you can keep the level -- keep it
at a certain level; right?
A. Not so much to keep it at a certain level. It's so we know
what's there.

Así que semanalmente se mide el nivel de contaminación del laboratorio, no porque sea posible hacer algo para evitarla, sino para saber cual era el nivel en el momento de analizar las muestras. Como consecuencia de los problemas del laboratorio del FBI en este y otros casos, se realizó una investigación que llevó a cabo -entre otras- las siguientes recomendaciones relativas a la contaminación en la unidad de explosivos:

Finally, the role of the EU with respect to the receipt of evidence should be modified to strengthen protections against contamination. Instrumental techniques have become very sensitive in detecting minute traces of explosives, which only magnifies the importance of preventing contamination of the evidence by persons handling it or from other materials present in the work area. Swab kits, clothing, and evidence to be examined for traces of explosives would preferably first be sent to a designated area that is physically separate from the main EU facility. The area designated for the receipt of evidence requiring residue analysis should have strictly controlled access and appropriate procedures to monitor and prevent possible contamination.

La cuestión resulta de tal importancia que los nuevos laboratorios del FBI la tandrán en cuenta desde su diseño

In response to a draft of this Report, the FBI advised that it concurs in each of the OIG's recommendations. The FBI noted that a new Evidence Control Policy was issued in November, 1996; that evidence handling and contamination avoidance is a high priority in the design of the new FBI Laboratory; that evidence control will be addressed in the core curriculum for new examiners and in the annual seminar to be attended by experienced examiners; and that greater collaboration between the EU and the CTU has taken place on the issue of contamination avoidance.

Un año después, las medidas estaban comenzando a implementarse

C. Contamination

The FBI has implemented the OIG recommendation to modify the procedures in the EU (now EOG) to strengthen protections against contamination in the receipt and handling of evidence. During our interviews, however, we noted some confusion concerning the periodic testing of the EOG area for contamination. The MDU unit chief thought the Chemistry Unit (CU) was testing the EOG area for contamination, but was unaware of any reports of the testing. The CU unit chief told us he was not testing the EOG area for contamination. We were assured by the Laboratory Director that this problem would be solved and that the EOG area would be tested periodically for contamination. We note that it is important for the MDU to take responsibility for the testing of its own area, whether the testing is performed by the MDU, the CU, or some other unit, and that the MDU should make sure that it receives reports of the testing.

In response to the preliminary draft of this follow-up report, the Laboratory Director informed us that, after our interviews the week of March 30, 1998, the FBI significantly strengthened its procedures to minimize the risk of contamination in the MDU. These new procedures include weekly testing of the MDU area for trace amounts of explosives

Así que parece que las cuestiones de contaminación no solo no son nuevas, sino que son una de las principales preocupaciones de los laboratorios de explosivos. Primero en Gran Bretaña, y luego en EEUU cuando les sacaron los colores. Espero que todo este triste, triste episodio sirva por lo menos para que ahora sean nuestros laboratorios los que se pongan las pilas. Por desagracia, me temo que ni tan siquiera saquemos esa "ganancia secundaria".

En todo caso y antes de empezar a desvariar, parece evidente que las medidas de precaución necesarias para evitar la contaminación de las muestras no se siguieron nunca, ni en el laboratorio de los TEDAX, ni en el la PC, ni el última pericial judicial. El simple hecho de mantener en las mismas instalaciones muestras en las que se buscan trazas -las de los focos de las explosiones- con muestras de explosivo intacto parece una practica altamente cuestionable. El Titadyne de cañaveras me parece cada vez más una muy probable fuente de la contaminación de NG. La verdad es que ahora empiezo a tener ganas de ver las grabaciones de la pericial para comprobar si nuestros peritos seguían los estrictos protocolos anti-contaminación que parecen necesarios. Ya sabemos que uno de los primordiales -medir el nivel de contaminación en el ambiente y supongo que algunos instrumentos- no se realizaba.

Ya, un poco largo, pesado y en Inglés. Pero si has leído hasta aquí espero que te haya resultado interesante